Trust and Trustworthiness in the Economy: How They Function and How They Should Be Promoted by Arai, Kazuhiro
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Trust and Trustworthiness in the Economy: How They
Function and How They Should Be Promoted
Author(s) Arai, Kazuhiro
Citation Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 48(2): 225-240
Issue Date 2007-12
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version publisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/15175
RightTRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS IN THE ECONOMY: HOW THEY
FUNCTION AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE PROMOTED

K6OJ=>GD AG6>
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University




Trust and trustworthiness are important in achieving e$ciency in the economy. Neoclas-
sical economists and many psychologists believe that they exist somewhere from the beginning.
This paper argues that this view is wrong and that trust should be generated with the e#orts
of various constituents of society within suitably designed institutions. Of particular impor-
tance are courts and government, which support trust in the whole of society. The mass media
and scientists are also important in monitoring ﬁrms and government to promote trust. This
paper starts with my deﬁnition of trust and discussion of how trust and trustworthiness
contribute to e$ciency.
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I. Introduction
Trust plays an important role in the economy, but neoclassical economics (mainstream
economics) has ignored this fact.
1 Indeed, very few economics textbooks discuss trust. Most
economics textbooks do not contain even the word “trust.” Consequently, it is quite likely that
those who learned economics have obtained a wrong view that the economy achieves e$ciency
without trust or trustworthiness. For this reason, some economic scientists might think that
the main role of economics in society is to implant the illusion among ordinary people that
economic e$ciency can be achieved without utilizing such “irrationality” as trust and
trustworthiness.
This sort of ignorance and misunderstanding of trust and trustworthiness have ﬁnally
brought serious problems to the real economy, such as the prevalence of unethical or illegal
behavior and the resulting social chaos (ine$ciency). Symbolic examples are the tens of
serious scandals that have occurred one after another in many well-known Japanese corpora-
 The author gratefully acknowledges the ﬁnancial assistance of a grant-in-aid for scientiﬁc research.
1 Here, neoclassical economics stands for the Arrow-Debreu model. See Arrow-Debreu (1954) and Debreu
(1959).
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organizations. The public sector and schools are not functioning well, either.
At issue at this moment of time is the scandal of sloppy pension management by the Social
Insurance Agency. Properly speaking, a public agency needs to remove distrust and promote
trust by exemplary conduct, but this agency has behaved to the contrary without any such
intention.
On the other hand, if ﬁrms lack trustworthiness, markets fail to supply goods of the
quality consumers want. This is quite obvious in the cases of medical care and education (of
private schools), although it is also true of many other industries. Acquiring high-quality
goods under insu$ciency of trust and trustworthiness requires larger transaction costs,
because more complete contracts become necessary. This will give rise to higher market prices.
In general, when society faces insu$cient trust and trustworthiness, chaos arises in many
parts including markets, organizations, and general social life. Contrary to the above illusion
generated by neoclassical economics, lack of trust and trustworthiness leads to ine$cient
allocation of resources.
Unfortunately, trust and trustworthiness have experienced drastic changes in the past
nearly twenty years. During this period, the world was occupied with the ideas of marketism,
neo-liberalism, and market fundamentalism, which have derived from neoclassical economics
and do not make much of trust or trustworthiness. These ideas claim that almost all social
problems can be solved on the basis of the market principle.
As they prevailed in the world, rapid declines in trust and trustworthiness occurred all
over the world. Indirect evidence for this is the spread of trust studies in the world. The
above-mentioned corporate scandals occurred in this process. Therefore, it is quite beneﬁcial
to consider both neoclassical economics and trust problems at the same time.
This paper discusses what roles trust and trustworthiness play in markets and organiza-
tions and how they should be promoted and maintained. In particular, it argues for the
important roles played by major social constituents such as courts, government, the mass
media, and scientists in promoting trust. Courts and government promote trust by behaving
trustworthily. Very important roles of the mass media and scientists are to monitor govern-
ment and ﬁrms and to criticize them when necessary. This paper emphasizes that neoclassical
economists and many psychologists have the wrong view that trust and trustworthiness exist
somewhere from the beginning into the far future.
In the following, my deﬁnition of trust is discussed ﬁrst. Then, it is shown as general
theory why lack of trust and trustworthiness gives rise to economic ine$ciency. This also
reveals where shortcomings exist in the paradigm of neoclassical economics, which has the
simplistic and optimistic proposition that pursuit of self-interest leads to optimal allocation of
resources. Next, it is shown how trust and trustworthiness contribute to economic e$ciency in
markets and organizations, which constitute major parts of the economy.
Then, an argument follows that courts, government, the mass media, and scientists play
very important roles in promoting and maintaining trust and trustworthiness. These considera-
tions will be useful when we try to recover trust, which has been lost to a large extent in many
parts of the world including Japan over the past nearly twenty years.
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Many researchers admit that trust is hard to deﬁne. It is necessary, however, to deﬁne it
concisely to discuss trust. I would like to introduce my own deﬁnition here in comparison with
a typical deﬁnition proposed among psychologists and sociologists.
Chiba (1997) proposes the following deﬁnition of trust: An individual trusts another
individual if the former takes an action involving risk in anticipation that the latter will behave
in a manner favorable to the former in a situation where there is inherent uncertainty. It is well
known that Deutsch (1962) and many other psychologists and sociologists propose similar
deﬁnitions.
This deﬁnition has several shortcomings. First, it considers trust as an action towards the
trustee, but there are many cases in which this does not hold. For example, individual A may
tell individual Bt hat A trusts individual C without doing anything towards C. Secondly, there
can be many levels of the above favorable manner and action involving risk. Thirdly, it is a
matter of course that there is risk when there is inherent uncertainty, generating tautology.
Fourthly, because this deﬁnition assumes uncertainty in the behavior of the trustee, it is unable
to deﬁne perfect trust even though most researchers of trust implicitly regard the state of
perfect trust as ideal.
The deﬁnition that I proposed in Arai (2000) does not have such shortcomings. I devised
several di#erent deﬁnitions in accordance with the level of rigor required. I would like to
introduce the simplest one here: Individual A trusts individual Bi f A expects that Bw ill
behave either as Bs aid or in accordance with the social norms (when Bs aid nothing). This
expectation should be described in terms of subjective probability. Strictly speaking, then, the
above deﬁnes the degree of A’s trust in B. Implicit in this deﬁnition is that for Bt o behave
trustworthily means for him to behave (towards A or others) either as he said or in accordance
with the social norms (when he said nothing).
Even if A feels that Bi s trustworthy, others may not feel so, since the expectation at issue
here is subjective. Thus, the above deﬁnition of trust should be applied to each truster. Indeed,
A may trust Bi n work time but may not do so in private time, so this deﬁnition should be
applied not to the trustee in all situations but to the trustee in a particular situation.
Psychological analyses of trust tend to adopt a dichotomy between those who are always
trustworthy and those who are always untrustworthy, in other words, between good-natured
people and bad-natured people as in Yamagishi (1998). Chiba’s deﬁnition above can also be
interpreted as actually having this dichotomy. As stated below, this is a wrong approach. This
black-and-white view can be avoided if my deﬁnition of the degree of trust above is used.
If all members in society were classiﬁed into those who are always trustworthy and those
who are always untrustworthy, it would be worthless to study trust and trustworthiness. This
is because it is quite easy to distinguish the former from the latter by low-cost experiments. In
addition, it is impossible to promote trust. This dichotomy also implies that trustworthiness
exists from the beginning among those who are always trustworthy and that the total amount
of trustworthiness in society is invariant from the beginning into the far future. Therefore,
those trust researchers who regard trust as a matter of black and white are in fact admitting
that their studies are valueless.
It should be added that trustworthy behavior in society X is not necessarily the same as
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be di#erent even among those who are in the same society, although the importance of this
di#erence is smaller than that between di#erent societies.
III. Why the Economy Needs Trust
Strictly speaking, neoclassical economics implicitly admits the necessity of trust for
economic transactions or for e$ciency in particular. More precisely, it assumes that all
economic agents are completely trustworthy in the sense that they can be expected to comply
perfectly with the law and contracts. If this assumption were not satisﬁed, neoclassical
economics would not hold because it does not have either the police or courts.
In connection with the above black-and-white view of trust, neoclassical economics
assumes that all economic agents are good natured as far as compliance with the law and
contracts is concerned. It should be emphasized that this kind of complete trust exists from the
beginning into the far future in neoclassical economics, because it is exogenously given in its
paradigm.
If the above as well as the other well-known su$cient conditions are satisﬁed in
neoclassical economics, a competitive equilibrium exists and it achieves an e$cient allocation
of resources. It needs to be noted that in neoclassical economics, each economic agent has only
to pursue self-interest for this e$ciency. In the real economy, however, pursuit of self-interest
does not necessarily lead to e$ciency, as most ordinary people agree. This is because it has
problems that neoclassical economics does not consider.
The most fundamental problem is the existence of transaction costs, which in general
makes contracts incomplete. In other words, the existence of transaction costs makes it
impossible to hold su$ciently detailed contracts and guarantee observance, because it would
entail astronomical costs.
If a contract contains incompleteness, the parties can decide their own behavior with
some degree of freedom without violating it because it has room for discretion. This in turn
generates interdependence among the parties, since in this case, one party’s welfare depends on
the choice of the other party’s behavior.
This interdependence often gives rise to a prisoners’ dilemma situation, in which pursuit
of self-interest on the part of the two parties will lead to a state that is unfavorable to both. In
other words, lack of consideration for the opponent will generate a disadvantageous state for
both.
Therefore, if each opponent can be expected to be trustworthy enough not to take action
that will produce an unfavorable state, then the welfare of both parties will be higher. Namely,
e$ciency will be achieved if the game participants can be expected either to behave ethically
or to keep promises that were made when the contract was formed. It is in this sense that trust
and trustworthiness become important in the real economy.
2
It should be noted that the type and degree of necessary trust di#er across various kinds
2 The importance of trust is discussed in well-known literature such as Zand (1972), Arrow (1974), Fox
(1974), Coleman (1988), and Fukuyama (1995). However, they do not have a clear deﬁnition of trust or game
theoretic considerations.
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with mechanical contracts (such as transactions of life insurance), those without any explicit
contracts (such as transactions in retail shops), and those with only simple contracts that cover
complex behavior (such as labor transactions within organizations). Trust and trustworthiness
are important in each, but they are most important in the last case.
IV. Trust Needed in Markets
In the markets described by neoclassical economics, individuals pursue self-interest with
a high degree of independence and without considering others’ welfare. Essentially, they seek
short-term beneﬁts. I have devised a special term for the values with these characteristics. It is
“the values for markets.”
3 This term means that those values are especially important in
markets, although markets in the real economy also need other values as discussed below.
Self-centeredness is at the core of the values for markets.
The above image of markets created by neoclassical economics tends to apply relatively
well, for example, to markets for agricultural products and sundry goods in the real economy.
In many real markets, however, trust and trustworthiness also play essential roles against this
image of markets.
A very important reason for this is “information asymmetry,” a situation in which
di#erent economic agents have di#erent amounts of information about the product to be
traded. In most markets, the suppliers have more information than the demanders, and the
former are likely to undertake transactions that are advantageous to them.
4
If a large number of economic agents become aware of such “unfair” transactions,
however, the markets may either shrink or even disappear. This is the well-known phenomenon
of the market for “lemons,” which was analyzed by Akerlof (1970) for the used car market.
Suppose, as another example more suitable for this paper, that some vegetable producers
use harmful agricultural chemicals but that consumers are unable to distinguish safe from
harmful products sold in the market. Then, this information asymmetry drastically reduces the
demand for the vegetable. Hence, those producers that do not use such chemicals will also face
sales di$culty. This is a situation in which there are actually both producers who want to
supply safe products and consumers who want to buy them, but transactions among them are
not carried out. It is obviously ine$cient.
In order to restore e$ciency, the market needs to acquire consumers’ trust by making
producers appreciate social responsibility, by establishing institutions that induce correct
information provision, and by devising monitoring systems that can punish dishonest produc-
ers. It is especially important that the industry in question has its own monitoring systems,
which will enable it to avoid undue governmental supervision.
In some industries, cooperation among ﬁrms in the same industry prompts information
sharing and enables them to check the opportunistic behavior of their customer ﬁrms (Smitka,
1991; Sako, 1996). Thus, it can become pressure that induces trustworthy behavior of ﬁrms in
3 See Arai (1997) and Arai (2006).
4 Even markets for agricultural products have recently come to need trustworthiness because of poisonous
imported vegetables.
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Since a great number of consumers consume standardized homogeneous products in the
case of most industrial products, defective products can be relatively easily detected. Moreo-
ver, among millions of consumers, there are at least a few who take the initiative in questioning
the producers’ responsibility for their production of defective goods.
In contrast, in many service industries such as medical service, service contents can be
manipulated and information asymmetry can be used to provide low-quality services at least to
some consumers. It may be hard for consumers to detect and verify mistakes or injustices in
such services, and service suppliers are not likely to be accused unless they behave extremely
badly. Those consumers who are easily deceived may receive bad or harmful services.
Unethical marketing of an industrial product that targets older consumers can be
characterized as being located in between, because the product sold is standardized but sales
services can be adjusted in accordance with each consumer. Suppliers may give wrong
information to those consumers who are easily deceived and induce them to purchase unduly
expensive or ine#ective goods.
Many markets have information asymmetry, di#ering from the neoclassical market view.
This makes it essential for markets to have trustworthy suppliers. It is surely important to have
a good legal system that induces trustworthy behavior on the part of suppliers.
However, that is not su$cient for e$ciency, because of incompleteness of the law. For
example, it is obvious that the law cannot prescribe the contents of education provided by
private schools. It is therefore necessary to also establish institutions and culture in a broad
sense that generate trustworthy markets.
All of these methods are quite di#erent from neoclassical ideas. Simple pursuit of
self-interest would not bring about e$ciency.
V. Trust Needed in Organizations
The degree of contract completeness is quite low for transactions of labor services within
organizations. It may be interesting to investigate the reasons. One is that they involve
complicated human behavior, which is hard to prescribe in contracts. In addition, it is likely
that transactions with low contract completeness have been gathered into organizations.
It should be added that within-organization transactions can be rephrased as human
relations. Moreover, they include not only employer-employee human relations that neoclassi-
cal economics analyzes but also employee-employee human relations that it does not analyze.
The latter human relations are much more important in daily work because of team production
or interdependence in work, even though formal contracts among employees are seldom made.
If transaction costs were low, those formal contracts would be worth being made.
Because contracts are incomplete within organizations, transactions based on pursuit of
self-interest are likely to lead to ine$ciency there. Then, why does the general equilibrium
theory generate a simple conclusion that pursuit of self-interest leads to a Pareto e$cient
allocation of resources? The answer is that neoclassical economics does not consider true
production e$ciency by assuming that production functions are exogenously given and
invariant.
Organizational e$ciency in the real economy requires organization members to have
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values generate cooperation. In addition, organizational loyalty is likely to generate members’
nonreciprocal contribution to the organization. However, neoclassical economics ignores these
facts and describes production functions as the simple relationships between inputs and
outputs both of which are traded in the markets. In this sense, neoclassical economics is quite
mechanical and lacks consideration of cultural factors.
In fact, the concept of production functions is a clever device that conceals important
defects of neoclassical economics. It plays the role of hiding the complexity of organizations
and diverting attention to e$ciency from organizations to markets. The fact that neoclassical
economics does not discuss organizational e$ciency can be expressed by pointing to its
inability to assess the relative superiority or inferiority of a variety of production functions. In
this sense, neoclassical economics considers only market e$ciency ignoring organizational
e$ciency, even though it has organizations (ﬁrms) in its paradigm.
Since contract completeness is generally low in organizations, behavior based on trust
becomes indispensable there. I claim that trust is the most important value for organizations.
Hence, I deﬁne an organization as an entity that maximizes proﬁts or minimizes production
costs including transaction costs by letting its members (try to) trust each other and carry out
(internal) transactions successively and by devising institutions and management that rein-
force trust.
In the following, I would like to elaborate on this deﬁnition to some extent. In doing so,
it is useful to use game theory to show that trust closely relates to transaction successiveness
or interaction repetition.
The theory of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game suggests that cooperation tends to
arise in an organization when the same individuals continue to work interactively in the same
workplace for a long period of time. In particular, the theory of the ﬁnitely repeated game with
incomplete information developed by Kreps et al. (1882) demonstrates that cooperation is
likely to arise either when the stage game is repeated su$ciently many times or when subjective
probability p that the opponent will be cooperative (irrational) is high. They claim that even
when p is very small, cooperation can arise if the stage game is repeated a very large number
of times.
5
The organization can satisfy the former condition by o#ering high job security or by
making successive transactions possible. The second condition relates to trust. Kreps et al.
(1882) assume that society has two kinds of individuals: those who are cooperative (trustwor-
thy) and those who are uncooperative (untrustworthy). The former group of people can be
considered to use the tit-for-tat strategy (Gibbons, 1992). It is the portion of these people that
Kreps et al. regard as p. This is exactly the view that considers trust as a matter of black and
white.
In contrast, my view is that both a cooperative (trustworthy) individual and an uncoop-
erative (untrustworthy) individual cohabit within each player and the former emerges with
probability p (the value of p may di#er across players). According to this view, p can be
interpreted as the degree of trust discussed in Section II. Moreover, the value of p is
determined subjectively in each particular game situation (Arai, 2001). This view generates
the proposition that the higher the degree of trust, the more likely it is that cooperation is
5 See also Axelrod (1984).
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Because culture determines the level of trust to a large extent, it a#ects how much
cooperation is achieved in an organization.
6 This means that culture inﬂuences organizational
e$ciency, since a cooperative equilibrium is more e$cient than an uncooperative equilibrium
in a repeated game. It should be added that culture here contains two components: societal
culture and organizational culture. The latter kind of culture is likely to be changed in a
relatively short period of time by the e#orts of organization members and managers in
particular.
This discussion reveals that, generally speaking, it is desirable for organizations with a
culture of larger p to use a work mode that involves cooperation by o#ering some job security.
This is because the beneﬁt of cooperation generated by the job security is likely to surpass the
cost incurred by it (i.e., the cost of labor hoarding). On the other hand, organizations with a
culture of smaller p had better not use such a mode, because they would need to o#er very high
job security to induce cooperation and it is costly.
These considerations imply that culture inﬂuences organizational modes and e$ciency. In
other words, culture a#ects the types of institutions adopted and the resulting e$ciency. Of
course, the above model of two work modes is very simple. In the real economy, there is a
spectrum of job security levels and their corresponding cooperation levels. It should be added
that there are actually no organizations without any job security, because, as mentioned above,
all organizations have some degree of transaction successiveness. Hence, organizations can
exist only by making use of culture. It is a serious mistake for neoclassical economics to have
spread in the world the claim that economic e$ciency is independent of culture.
There are many elements in the “institutions that reinforce trust,” which are described in
the above deﬁnition of organization. They include sharing information in the workplace and
institutions that guarantee fairness and equal opportunity, to name a few. In addition to these
institutional devices, management that fosters trust is indispensable.
Not only trust but also such values as self-restraint and organizational loyalty enhance
organizational e$ciency. In contrast with the values for markets, I call these three mutually
related values “the values for organizations.”
The values for organizations are characterized by pursuit of common interests, interde-
pendence, concern for others, and pursuit of long-term beneﬁts. The fact that real human
beings possess these values is demonstrated by game experiments that have revealed that many
subjects punish the unjust behavior and reward ethical behavior of others by bearing their own
costs (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000).
The degree to which these values are respected depends on the above two kinds of culture,
societal and organizational. Against the claim of neoclassical economics, it is not the pursuit
of self-interest but these values that generate e$ciency within organizations.
VI. The E#ect of Marketism on Trust
The Japanese economy since the collapse of the “bubble” at the beginning of the 1990s can
be characterized by the prevalence of marketism, which originated from neoclassical econom-
6 Some game experiments show that culture a#ects cooperation (Henrich et al., 2001; Roth et al., 1991).
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resource allocations be determined in markets and that nonmarket resource allocations should
be minimized.
One of the e#ects of marketism is that it has eliminated traditional Japanese values of
concern for others and introduced dry human relations in many places including the work-
place. Indeed, an implicit but important aim of neoclassical economics is to destroy traditions,
and marketism achieved this aim in Japan quite successfully. Together with the concurrent
globalization, marketism dominated many advanced countries in this way in the 1990s and
afterwards.
From the viewpoint of Japanese culture, this era will probably be considered especially
important in the whole of Japanese history. The reason is that many traditional values that
Japanese people had accumulated disappeared in this era. The powerful campaign promoted by
government and mass media obliged many Japanese people to accept marketism. In fact, this
idea spread very quickly because of the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma game, i.e., one is likely
to be used if one does not behave in accordance with marketism when others behave so.
A typical example of the prevalence of marketism is the expansion of the pay-for-
performance system. It is an institution that has introduced the market principle into
organizations.
The pay-for-performance system has the following characteristics. First, the employer
evaluates mainly each worker’s explicit contribution as his performance. Secondly, it measures
performance in a short period of time and relates it to the pay in that period. Thirdly, it
provides large labor incentives by enlarging wage di#erentials among workers within the same
organization and heavily rewarding those who have achieved high performance. Hence, this
system has all the traits of the values for markets, i.e., pursuit of self-interest, independence,
apathy towards others, and pursuit of short-run beneﬁts.
As Arai et al. (2006) revealed, the introduction of the pay-for-performance system has
had many undesirable e#ects on Japanese organizations. Its basic idea itself suggests that it will
reduce trust and cooperation among coworkers in organizations. In essence, the introduction
of the values for markets into organizations has expelled trust and other values for organiza-
tions.
The large number of scandals that have occurred since the mid-1990s as mentioned in
Section I are not unrelated to the movement of marketism, because many Japanese people have
come to hold the idea that making proﬁts in markets is proper irrespective of the methods used.
However, the neoclassical view that the reward an individual receives in the market is his
contribution to society is true only when all of its assumptions are satisﬁed. Unfortunately, the
real economy does not satisfy them in most cases.
This can be stated more speciﬁcally. It is true that neoclassical economics assumes
implicitly that each economic agent complies with the law and contracts as mentioned above.
However, the law and contracts are likely to be incomplete in the real economy, so complying
with customs and ethics actually becomes very important. It is mainly the customs and ethics
(and sometimes the law) that tend to be violated due to increased competition and/or personal
desires. It can actually happen that individuals who violate them to acquire large proﬁts
become heroes.
The past nearly twenty years in Japan is an era when the trust level has become very low
not only in markets and organizations but also in society in general including schools and
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unable to teach how individuals should behave in society or groups, because marketism has
expelled the traditional values that used to be taught. Independence is now emphasized in
schools as the value for “modern society,” but this old European value does not function well,
either, as discussed above in detail in relation to neoclassical economics.
Marketism has spread the idea that it is desirable for individuals to pursue only
self-interest in any place including organizations, schools, and families. It has maintained that
only such behavior will generate a superior society. It is impressive, however, that the
international competitiveness of Japanese corporations decreased in parallel with the spread of
marketism. It is also worth mentioning that many societies have faced disorder as marketism
spreads. In the United States, crime and divorce have become very serious problems (Fu-
kuyama, 1999).
VII. How to Create and Maintain Trust
Since trust and trustworthiness are essential for achieving e$ciency, it is urgently needed
to reestablish and maintain them at a high level. How can it be possible? I would like to
consider this question in the following. There are basically two methods, the ﬁrst requiring
short-term e#orts to produce some e#ects and the second requiring long-term e#orts to
produce large e#ects. Both methods involve cultural e#orts.
It is sometimes possible to recover trust at a very low cost because trust is a kind of
expectation and expectations can be modiﬁed relatively easily in some cases.
7 A typical
example is to clarify basic ideas for management where such clariﬁcation has not been
attempted. For instance, an organization can clarify how much weight it places on such values
as independence, cooperation, equality, and so on. This is especially e#ective in Japanese
organizations because most of them lack expressly stipulated basic ideas, which used to be
unnecessary when organization members shared implicit values. It is also e#ective in schools
and society in general. Its e#ectiveness increases if the basic ideas are repeatedly advocated.
One of the most serious problems in today’s society is that there are few people who
advocate values other than freedom with rigorous logic, although thinking from a wider
perspective on the basis of various values is really needed. If basic ideas are made clear,
behavior on those lines will increase because human beings tend to follow what they have been
taught. At the same time, more people expect such behavior on the part of other people,
generating a state with more trust.
A related method is to clarify basic rules. Making rules does not solve everything because
of contract incompleteness, but they need to be clear because they reﬂect the basic ideas for
management. It is often the case that establishing basic rules makes penetration of corporate
ideas (culture) smooth. Clariﬁcation of rules is especially necessary in organizations where
basic rules have been deliberately made obscure in order to commit injustices with ease.
It is also important to monitor the trustee and prevent him/her from committing
injustices. At the same time, important organizational a#airs including detected injustices need
to be disclosed to those who are within the proper range. This often makes it possible for
7 Of course, there are opposite cases in which it is extremely di$cult to modify expectations.
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the organization. Game experiments reveal that monitoring makes players behave more
trustworthily (Arai, 2005).
Few people would behave trustworthily in many cases without proper social pressure.
This kind of thinking is not likely to arise if one thinks as many psychologists do that desirable
behavior “forced by” social pressure cannot be classiﬁed as trust. It should also be emphasized
that neoclassical economics lacks ideas of monitoring and disclosure because it assumes that all
individuals comply perfectly with the law and contracts.
Communication that is constantly held among those who are concerned is also e#ective in
promoting trustworthy behavior especially in organizations. This does not require large costs.
Psychologists such as Dawes et al. (1977) and van de Kragt et al. (1983) claim that pre-play
communication in game experiments generates cooperation by making those involved con-
scious of the ethics of “doing the right things.” In fact, deviation incurs a large psychological
cost in the human relations of those who hold constant communication. I would like to add
and emphasize that an individual who is planning to deviate tends to avoid communication.
I propose utilizing persuasion as a method of generating trust. Game experiments show
that if a third person persuades those who are in interdependent relations to cooperate, then
the probability that they cooperate (act trustworthily) increases to a signiﬁcant degree (Arai,
1995; Arai, 2005). I think that persuasion is more powerful than communication in generating
cooperation, because persuasion is undertaken not by the game opponent but by a third person.
Note that the above pre-play communication is held between those who have somewhat
conﬂicting interests.
In real organizations, managers need to undertake important persuasion. It should be
emphasized, however, that they need to have acted as examples to establish trust within the
organization in order for persuasion to be e#ective. The e#ects of persuasion are likely to be
small if it is undertaken by those managers who are always thinking about their own
self-interest.
Now, I would like to turn attention to methods of recovering trust in the long run. The
most important method is to use school education. If schools teach clearly how trust
relationships should be, then most young people will follow it and expect others to follow it as
well. This is nothing but promotion of trust. The most serious problem of today’s school
education is that schools are unable to teach values other than freedom and independence (the
values for markets). Japanese schools need to devise methods of teaching theoretically why
consideration for others is necessary. In this process, more social scientists need to participate
in the formulation of education policies and education contents.
To enhance job security is a very important method of recovering trust in the long run for
organizations. High job security enables the organization members to play repeated games for
a long period of time and tends to promote cooperation and trustworthy behavior. Moreover,
it establishes long-term human relations, which change workers’ expectations of other workers.
That is, it generates the expectation that others will not deviate partly because the psychologi-
cal costs of deviation are high. This is another method of trust promotion.
In addition, if high job security stabilizes many citizens’ life, trustworthy behavior will
prevail more extensively in society in general. The unusual atmosphere of today’s Japanese
society symbolized by the frequent occurrence of abnormal crimes is not unrelated to job
instability that has increased in the past ten years or so.
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thiness do not exist somewhere from the beginning. They mostly need to be formed with e#orts
on the basis of di#erent principles from pursuit of self-interest. In addition, cultural e#orts
such as communication and persuasion play important roles in generating trustworthy
behavior.
VIII. The Roles of Courts and Government
Public institutions play a quintessential role in promoting and maintaining trust. This can
be easily understood if we consider cases in which they destroy trust. A society where money
or power can manipulate court judgments is one with the lowest level of trust. In such a
society, some members do not receive any punishment whatever injustices they commit. In
addition, there are certainly many other individuals who play up to them. Hence, untrust-
worthy behaviors (evils) prevail throughout society.
Although this may be extreme, it is not improbable in any society that judges make
decisions on the basis of their tastes, with special favor to particular social groups or classes,
or from a very narrow viewpoint in general.
It is therefore essential for a high-trust society that courts give impartial and proper
judgments. In this sense, courts play the role of the pivot of a fan, supporting trustworthy
behavior in the whole of society. All trust would collapse if courts became untrustworthy. This
structure is similar to that of an organization in which the top manager supports trustworthy
behavior within the organization.
This view on trust is in stark contrast with the views of neoclassical economists and many
psychologists that claim that trust exists somewhere from the beginning. Judges need to have
not only an impartial mind but also a broad view of things in order to make proper decisions.
It is the role of education to produce such people. This is entirely a cultural problem. The
principle of pursuit of self-interest would not produce desirable judges.
Government also plays a quintessential role in promoting and maintaining trust. Corrupt
government generates a low-trust society as was true of ex-socialist governments in Eastern
Europe (Casson, 1991). Historically speaking, even some public policies that government
enforced with conﬁdence destroyed trust (Levi, 1998). Improper policies change the trust
structure in society to a signiﬁcant degree. A typical example is war initiated by government.
Even those policies that most people consider proper are likely to change the trust structure.
An example is social security policies, which have changed people’s trust in their family
considerably.
Unless government behaves trustworthily and takes a lead, the general trust level in the
private sector decreases, since both private ﬁrms and citizens perceive that they need not
behave trustworthily when government does not. It is necessary in this sense to note with
special care the meaning of the irresponsible pension management of the Social Insurance
Agency that was recently revealed. Japanese people are likely to think that other government
agencies are also doing similar things, giving rise to a general decline in trust.
It should be added that a government’s policies and guidance cannot be e#ectuated if trust
is lacking. The large amount of data it publicizes is not likely to be used e#ectively, either, and
does not have desirable e#ects on the economy or society. All sorts of such things reinforce the
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trust.
Traditionally, the Japanese government enjoyed high trust, but recently, this does not
hold any longer as the above case of the Social Insurance Agency typically suggests. On the
other hand, Japanese politicians have traditionally had di$culty in receiving trust from general
citizens. A comparative study between Japan and Sweden also conﬁrms this point, although
Swedish politicians do not receive high trust, either, relative to other occupations in Sweden
(Arai et al., 2005).
It should be added that legislature and lawmakers should make laws that generate
trustworthy behavior. The law plays a role similar to the above-mentioned rules in organiza-
tions.
IX. The Roles of Professional Groups and Citizens
Some professional groups have the mission to play an important role in promoting trust.
Those who work for mass media and scientists (researchers) are especially important among
them.
Since trust is expectation or belief, it is greatly inﬂuenced by information provided by the
mass media such as TV and newspapers. Hence, promotion of trust requires these mass media
to supply correct information with the proper balance.
The mass media a#ect not only citizens’ fact understanding but also their value formation
and are likely to change their beliefs quite easily. In fact, the ideas of marketism and the
pay-for-performance system prevailed in the 1990s mainly with strong support of the mass
media. These ideas justiﬁed pursuit of self-interest on the part of ﬁrms and individuals and
reduced trust in society in general. Today, many of their undesirable e#ects are widely
observable. Thus, it is crucial for the mass media to have balanced views.
This consideration suggests that it is improper to use mass media to spread particular
ideologies. This is partly because they are in a dominant position in supplying information and
ideas that they like and suppressing what they do not like. Dissemination of ideologies by mass
media also tends to result in imprinting by simple phrases without logic. Moreover, anonymity
often used by the mass media is likely to lead to irresponsible provision of ideologies.
For these reasons, the mass media need to exert a sense of balance for the welfare of the
whole of society. Their important role is to use their power with a sense of balance to monitor
government and ﬁrms, which have political and/or economic power. The mass media are
expected to enhance the beneﬁts of general citizens, each of whom has little political or
economic power. Freedom of expression given to the mass media should be used to disclose
social injustices or untrustworthy behavior.
In comparison with the overwhelming power of today’s mass media, the inﬂuence of
consumer groups and citizen groups is rather weak. It is also beneﬁcial to society, however, for
such groups to monitor and accuse ﬁrms and government to make Japan a high-trust society.
The mass media should support the proper activities of those groups.
Scientists (researchers) also play a very important role as individuals or groups in
promoting trust. Their specialist knowledge can show how things should be and makes it
possible for them to monitor and criticize government and ﬁrms correctly, generating
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Neoclassical economics cannot explain such criticizing behavior because in general, it
does not bring about larger incomes. (More strictly speaking, individuals in neoclassical
economics are so independent that they are not interested in the welfare of other individuals.)
In most societies, those who criticize are disliked, which makes their incomes generally lower.
This fact implies that researchers are expected to contribute to the enhancement of social
welfare by abandoning their self-interest. This is why their employment and incomes need to
be secured in universities and similar institutions.
Scientists are expected not to pursue simple reciprocal good or give-and-take but to pursue
unrewarded good for the sake of the welfare of the whole of society (Arai, 1997; Gintis, 2000;
Arai, 2001). They are required to contribute to the betterment of society using their specialist
knowledge. Publication of papers and books in their specialized ﬁelds is not their only duty.
Mass citizens are also important in forming trust and trustworthiness. For example, if
they support reports, newspaper articles, and TV programs that are supplied by the mass media
for the sake of promoting trust and trustworthiness as discussed above, more of them are
supplied and ﬁrms and government become more trustworthy. If mass citizens are interested
only in frivolous newspaper articles or vulgar TV programs, the level of trust of the society will
become low.
Since each citizen can exert only negligible inﬂuence, it is solely when a large portion of
citizens have rich public spirit and interest in social problems that they can exert favorable
inﬂuence on society. In this sense, culture is again very important for e$ciency. Schools play
an essential role in training children so that they become good citizens. It is obvious that
today’s school education that emphasizes independence and pursuit of self-interest does not
produce such citizens. The mass media and scientists also need to contribute to the education
of children.
X. Conclusions
Trust and trustworthiness are very important in achieving economic e$ciency. However,
it does not exist from the beginning into the far future, as assumed by neoclassical economists
and many psychologists. It is promoted fully only if many constituents of society make
su$cient e#orts.
It is very important to establish institutions that generate trust and trustworthy behavior.
Leaders have responsibility to promote trust. It is necessary for courts and government to
check the decline in trust and trustworthiness by their own trustworthy behavior. On the other
hand, the mass media and scientists need to contribute to the promotion of trust and
trustworthiness by monitoring ﬁrms and government. Education needs to produce good
citizens.
Most of these are against pursuit of self-interest. Neoclassical economics is unable to show
that they are necessary because it is based on the assumption of individual optimization. Trust
and trustworthiness are promoted by a variety of constituents of society who behave with
proper intentions. Economic e$ciency is not achieved by pursuit of self-interest but by e#orts
to build a superior culture in this sense.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December ,-2R:;:G:C8:H
Akerlof, G. A. (1970), “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, pp.488-500.
Arai, K. (1995), “Kurikaeshi Shujin no Dilemma Game niokeru Communication to Settoku
[Communication and Persuasion in Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Games],” Ikkyo Ronso
[Hitotsubashi Review], 114, pp.996-1006.
Arai, K. (1997), Shushin-koyosei to Nihon-bunka [Lifetime Employment and Japanese Cul-
ture], Tokyo, Chuo Koronsha.
Arai, K. (2000), “Koyoseido no Nakano Shinrai [Trust in Labor Market Institutions],”
Keizagaku Kenkyu [Hitotsubashi University Research Series; Economics] 42, pp.105-156.
Arai, K. (2001), Bunka, Soshiki, Koyoseido: Nihonteki System no Keizai Bunseki [Culture,
Organization, and Labor Market Institutions: An Economic Analysis of the Japanese
System], Tokyo, Yuhikaku.
Arai, K. (2005), “Game Jikken ni Arawareru Shiri-tsuikyu to Bunka [Self-interest and
Culture Revealed in Game Experiments],” Keizaigaku Kenkyu [Hitotsubashi University
Research Series; Economics] 47, pp.247-290.
Arai, K. (2006), Shinrai to Jiyu [Trust and Freedom], Tokyo, Keisoshobo.
Arai, K., S. Oskarsson, I. Yamauchi, P. O »berg, T. Svensson, and S. Hirano (2005), “The
Structure and Determinants of Trust: The Cases of Japan and Sweden,” Hitotsubashi
Journal of Economics 46, pp.183-204.
Arai, K., I. Yamauchi and Y. Kurata (2006), “Seikashugi Chingin Seido ga Umidashita
Shokuba to Rodosha no Hennka [Workplace and Worker Changes Generated by the
Pay-for-Performance System],” Hitotsubashi Keizaigaku,[ Hitotsubashi Economics]2 ,p p .
163-186.
Arrow, K. J. (1974), The Limits of Organization, New York, W. W. Norton.
Arrow K. J. and G. Debreu (1954), “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive
Economy,” Econometrica 22, pp.265-90.
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books.
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995), “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,”
Games and Economic Behavior 10, pp.122-42.
Casson, M. (1991), The Economics of Business Culture, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Chiba, T. (1997), “Shijo to Shinrai: Kigyokan Torihiki o Chushin ni [Market and Trust: on
the Roles of Sociological Factors in Inter-ﬁrm Transactions],” Shakaigaku Hyoron,
[Japanese Sociological Review] 48, pp.317-333.
Coleman, J. S. (1988), “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal
of Sociology 94, pp.S95-S120.
Debreu, G. (1959), Theory of Value, New York, Wiley.
Dawes, R. M., J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee (1977), “Behavior, Communication, and
Assumptions about Other People’s Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation,” Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 35, pp.1-11.
Deutsch, M. (1962), “Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical Notes,” in: M. R. Jones ed.
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Lincoln, Nebraska, Nebraska University Press.
Fehr, E. and S. Gachter (2000), “Cooperation and Punishment,” American Economic Review
2007] IGJHI 6C9 IGJHILDGI=>C:HH >C I=: :8DCDBN ,-390, pp.980-994.
Fox, A. (1974), Beyond Contract, London, Farber and Farber.
Fukuyama, F. (1995), Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Glencoe,
Illinois, Free Press.
Fukuyama, F. (1999), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social
Order. New York, Free Press.
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, New Jersey, Princeton University
Press.
Gintis, H. (2000), “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,” Journal of Theoretical Biology
206, pp.169-79.
Henrich, J. B., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R. McElreath (2001),
“In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,”
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 91, pp.73-78.
Kreps, D. M., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the
Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory 27, pp.245-52.
Levi, M. (1998), “A State of Trust,” in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi eds. Trust and Governance,
New York, Russell Sage Foundation.
Roth, A. E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir (1991), “Bargaining and Market
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,”
American Economic Review 81, pp.1068-95.
Sako, M. (1998), “Does Trust Improve Business Performance?” in C. Lane and R. Bachmann
eds. Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applica-
tions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Smitka, M. (1991), Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry,N e w
York, Columbia University Press.
van de Kragt, A. J., J. M. Orbell, and R. M. Dawes (1983), “The Minimal Contributing Set
as a Solution to Public Goods Problems,” American Political Science Review 77, pp.112-
22.
Yamagishi, T. (1998), Shinrai no Kozo: Kokoro to Shakai no Shinka-Game [The Structure of
Trust: Evolutionary Games of Mind and Society], Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press.
Zand, D. E. (1972), “Trust and Managerial Problem Solving,” Administrative Science Quar-
terly 17, pp.229-239.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,.*